



Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

**3rd CSCAP Study Group Meeting on Regional
Peacekeeping and Peace-building**

New Delhi, December 8-9, 2006

Contents

Executive Summary	2
Inaugural Address: Lt Gen (Retd) Satish Nambiar	4
<i>Session 1: The Global and the Regional in Peacekeeping and Peace-building: Where Does One End and the Other Begin?</i>	6
<i>Session 2: The Interplay of Actors and Agendas in the Region: NGOs and Regional Organizations</i>	13
<i>Session 3: ASEAN and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Future Prospects and Lessons for Asia</i>	18
<i>Session 4: The Way Forward: Regional Peacekeeping Centers and the Development of a Regional Policy and Research Agenda</i>	22
Closing Session/Summation	26
Appendix 1: ICRC Recommendations	33
Glossary of Terms	34
Participants List	35

*This report was revised by Erin Elizabeth Williams, April 16, 2007. The report is not for citation or publication. For questions in this regard, please email cscapcan@interchange.ubc.ca or plizee@brocku.ca.

**Third Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on
Regional Peacekeeping and Peace-building
New Delhi, India, December 8-9, 2006
Executive Summary**

The CSCAP Study Group on Regional Peacekeeping and Peace-building convened its third and final meeting on December 8-9, 2006 in New Delhi, India. Study Group members brought forward an impressive range of national perspectives on issues they felt demanded greater attention at the global, regional, national, and civil society levels. The group identified four such issues and proposed tentative solutions for further consideration.

1) Coordination between the Region and the United Nations: Asia Pacific states contribute roughly half the troops and nearly a quarter of all police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions. Regional states also make significant military and police contributions to non-UN missions such as Afghanistan and several Pacific Island states. A regional perspective or 'voice' on the conduct of international peace operations has yet to coalesce, however, leaving the region's input and imprint out of proportion to its actual contributions. The formation of a consultative mechanism within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in order to monitor and advise the UN Peacebuilding Commission could help such a regional perspective come into focus and find channels of influence.

2) A Greater Role for Regional Organizations: The outbreak of conflict requires the immediate deployment of a standing capacity to minimize the extent of that conflict's violence and destruction and to create the diplomatic, political, and humanitarian space necessary for the successful negotiation of the conflict's end. Regional organizations have demonstrated the interest, willingness and capability for providing this needed rapid response capacity. Two examples of successful rapid deployment within the Asia Pacific region include the EU-ASEAN deployment to Aceh (under the Aceh Monitoring Mission, or AMM) and Australian/New Zealand deployment to conflict in the Solomon Islands (under the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, or RAMSI), as well as to conflicts in other Pacific Island states. Given the existing peacekeeping capacities of the region's states, a regional standing capacity could be formed to respond to regional crises such as the deterioration of law and order in the Pacific Islands and to natural and humanitarian disasters elsewhere in the region. This would not be in contradiction with the central role that the UN needs to play in the formulation and implementation of peacekeeping mandates. On the contrary, it would follow naturally from the provisions in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which call for the development of such regional arrangements. In all cases, regional debates and missions should be undertaken in light of the principles contained in the UN Charter.

3) Development of a Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program within the ASEAN Secretariat. Recent debates within ASEAN have focused on the future direction of the Association and the need for it to engage more directly issues of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. A program within the ASEAN Secretariat targeted directly at these issues would provide regional actors with guidance on matters such as humanitarian assistance in cases of conflict, conflict resolution initiatives, and post-conflict development frameworks. The program would also allow for a sustained dialogue between regional policy circles and civil society actors on matters of post-conflict reconstruction. The proposed Council of the ASEAN Security Community could develop the administrative and political elements related to this Program.

4) Training Inconsistencies and Lack of Communication among the Region's National Peacekeeping Facilities. Peacekeeping troops and police receive training for deployment in UN missions within their respective national training centers. The training they receive varies with respect to language, training doctrine, and pre-deployment briefings on the applicable law in a given conflict situation. Moreover, there is currently no venue for specific intra-regional sharing of

peacekeeping experiences and best practices. The region's various peacekeeping capacities should be better networked in order to minimize training inconsistencies and to benefit from others' practical experiences and 'lessons learned'. The formation of a regional association of the Asia Pacific's various national peacekeeping training centers, within the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (currently headquartered in India), would provide three benefits. First, it would allow the region to link more directly with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit. Second, it would allow for greater intra-regional cross-training in skills, doctrine, and applicable law, including international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law. And third, it would permit others within in the region who have an interest in developing greater peacekeeping capacity to draw from the existing skills and experiences of other regional members.

CSCAP 3rd Study Group Meeting on Peacekeeping and Peace-building December 8-9, 2007, New Delhi

Friday, December 8

Words of Welcome: Ambassador Kishan Rana and Professor Pierre Lizée

Ambassador Kishan Rana: Fifteen years into the post-Cold War period, the world that has taken shape resembles neither Fukuyama's vision of the "end of history" nor Huntington's vision of a "clash of civilizations". Instead, what we continue to confront is a world still plagued by civil conflict and human suffering. The demands for international peacekeeping and peace-building thus remain as significant as ever. Within this context, we note two trends. First, while states and governments are still central in providing the tools and means to promote international peace, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society actors have also emerged as important contributors. Second, demands for international peacekeeping have not only increased in number, but the expectations of good governance, both domestically and internationally, have also raised the standard for these operations' performance.

Dr. Pierre Lizée: The present meeting takes place within a context of great timeliness. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts are prominent on the current international agenda, and, as Ambassador Rana suggested, international peace operations' complexity, in terms of the growth in the number and type of actors involved, as well as the diversifying nature of their activities, creates pressing new questions for those actors. These questions, which will structure this meeting's discussions, emerge around four levels of international involvement: the global level, including the United Nations; the regional level, including regional organizations; the civil society level, including NGOs and other humanitarian actors; and at the organizational level, including national peacekeeping training centers.

Inaugural Address: Lt General (Retd) Satish Nambiar

In August 2006, the UN Security Council endorsed three missions, UNIFIL in Lebanon, UNMIS in Sudan, and UNMIT in East Timor¹, within the span of just 20 days. These three missions alone represented a 50% increase in the UN's deployed strength and a fourth major surge in UN peacekeeping commitments. While this surge signals a resounding expression of confidence by the Security Council in the UN's peacekeeping capabilities it also creates challenges for a UN that is struggling to manage the expansion of its existing peacekeeping operations. Moreover, these new mandates include ambiguous and dangerous tasks, many of which fall along, if not beyond, the margins of conventional peacekeeping.

With UNIFIL, the various parties are interpreting Resolution 1701's meaning in ways that have implications for understanding how to assist the Lebanese government at its request and how to properly authorize the use force to secure its area of operations against "hostile activities". For UNMIS, a critical issue will be the practical application of the "responsibility to protect" and the responsibility to prevent attacks against civilians. Another issue will be how to prevent the disruption of the Darfur Peace Agreement in an environment in which that agreement's provisions have been violated by all sides. Even UNMIT is breaking new ground by undertaking comprehensive security sector assessments that are without precedent.

¹ The details of the August decisions and the missions established are: (1) Resolution 1701 on Lebanon, adopted August 11th, 2006, which expanded the UN Interim Force in Lebanon by 15,000 troops; (2) Resolution 1704 on East Timor (Timor-Lest), adopted on August 25th, 2006, which created a new and much larger mission there (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Lest), comprising 1,608 police and 34 military liaison officers; (3) Resolution 1706 on Darfur, adopted August 31st, 2006, which expanded the UN Mission in Sudan by 17,300 troops, 3,300 civilian police, and 16 formed police units comprising an additional 2,000 police.

There are additional uncertainties about who will contribute the necessary equipment and troops to guarantee these missions' success. In UNIFIL, there are initial reasons to be optimistic that the required number of troops can be mobilized expediently, but in UNMIS, Western countries have been less forthcoming in offering either the troops or the enabling assets requested by the UN Secretary General. European states' 'return' to UN peacekeeping may warrant some initial optimism, but other than Swedes and the Irish, Europeans have not served in significant UN contingent formations for nearly a decade and may have thus grown unfamiliar with UN systems and procedures. This unfamiliarity creates deficits that become acute in light of the infrastructural and logistical challenges posed by the Darfur mission.

Another challenge to the success of UN peacekeeping missions is recruiting, training, and sustaining an adequate number of police and civilian staff. The civilian staff who fill critical roles in the management, financial, logistics, humanitarian, and human rights areas, are effectively the oil in the UN mission machine. Yet, when a new mission creates new civilian staff requirements, UN rules forbid existing personnel from simply being re-assigned from one mission to another. They instead must undergo a lengthy and exhaustive process at UN Headquarters that typically lasts between six and nine months. Furthermore, few countries have a surplus of well-trained police officers to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions. As a case in point, it may take up to two years to fully meet recently approved police levels in Darfur and East Timor.

While the UN's member states are expected to respond to the new Security Council decisions, three obstacles may impede progress. First, many Western countries are already heavily committed with military and police to non-UN peace operations such as Afghanistan. Other troop contributing countries (TCCs) are concerned about the recent deterioration of peace processes in situations where their forces are committed, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Cote d'Ivoire. Second, potential TCCs will have to weigh their commitments against domestic public and political concerns about safety issues and against a recent trend of some host nations trying to impose restrictions on UN personnel. Finally, all UN member states' financial contributions will rise as a consequence of these new Resolutions. Because of the heavy start-up costs involved in launching new operations, these expenses must be met quickly, but are nonetheless often under-funded because of some member states' failure to pay their obligatory contributions.

Together, all of these challenges make it difficult for UN missions to fulfill their mandates. This problem, however, is nothing new. The head of UN peacekeeping, Secretary-General Jean Marie Guehenno, has warned repeatedly that the UN's capacity to cope with a major surge in peacekeeping operations was questionable. He signaled this concern to the UN General Assembly in 2002, adding that at the time, developing countries were contributing the majority of the UN's peacekeeping troops. These countries, he said, could not and should not be expected to shoulder this burden alone.

In 2004, after the UN launched three new peacekeeping missions in quick succession (Burundi, Haiti, and Cote d'Ivoire), Guehenno reiterated the point; The UN was not adequately resourced or structured, he said, to provide this proliferation of missions with the necessary leadership teams or necessary induction and orientation. He added that "[q]uick and transparent recruitment of niche expertise, as opposed to generalists" remained a serious challenge and that the UN still lacked proper guidance documents such as updated manuals, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and specific training programs for personnel. Finally, Guehenno said that "limitless growth [was] not a smart business model in any field, and especially not in [the UN] where humility should be the rule. Surely, one of the lessons of the 1990s," he said, was "that the UN was asked to take on too many peacekeeping operations, with too few resources, in too many places where they did not necessarily belong. Let's not repeat history."

The *Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* (2004)² echoed Guehenno's concern. The real challenge in any deployment of forces, the report said, is ensuring that those forces have: (a) an appropriate, clear and well understood mandate, applicable to all the changing circumstances that might reasonably be envisaged, and (b) all the necessary resources to implement that mandate fully. The *Report* added that the demand for personnel outpaced the supply, and that if the international community remained committed to ending the intractable conflicts in Africa, the number of required peacekeepers would increase substantially. "In the absence of a commensurate increase in available personnel," the *Report* warned, "United Nations peacekeeping risks repeating some of its worst failures of the 1990s."

Finally, in the *Larger Freedom* Report (2005), the UN Secretary-General implored the UN membership to do more to ensure that the UN had "effective capacities for peacekeeping" that were commensurate with the demand placed upon it." He also encouraged the creation of strategic reserves that could be deployed rapidly within the UN framework.³ The World Summit Outcome of the same year also expressed support for standby arrangements, including the creation of "an initial operating capability for a standing police capacity."

It is within this context that we must deliberate on the manner in which our region contributes to this most vital and visible aspect of the maintenance of international peace and security.

Session One: The Global and the Regional in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Where Does One End and the Other Begin?

Brigadier General Satyanarayana: "The Experience as Commander Indian Brigade in MONUC"

The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has been one of the UN's largest, and most complex peacekeeping missions. In December 2004, an Indian brigade of 2,500 troops deployed to North Kivu Province in the Democratic Republic of Congo's Great Lakes region. At the time of its deployment, the brigade encountered a volatile and fragile area with large-scale human rights violations and destabilizing influences from neighboring Rwanda and Uganda. Furthermore, the local army had disintegrated, leaving the province devoid of any local authority to prevent mass killing, ethnic cleansing, rape, looting, and exploitation. Militia groups moved about freely in the area and controlled most of its mining activity. Under such conditions, the local population understandably harbored suspicions of men in uniform, which made the Indian brigade's task of restoring peace and stability to the region all the more challenging.

In spite of these challenges the Indian brigade succeeded in integrating various armed groups into the National Army and pressuring the local militia to either join mainstream society or face stiff opposition. The brigade also helped repatriate 2,348 Rwandan rebels and force the surrender of 6,500 Congolese from the local militia. Finally, the brigade helped establish the rule of law in the province and fostered the conditions necessary for holding the first democratic elections in DRC in over forty years. A voter turnout rate of 80% speaks to the mission's success.

In addition, the Indian brigade undertook several humanitarian projects designed to invigorate the lives of villagers in remote areas. Locally driven projects such as development of roads, tracks, and bridges, and regular interaction between the Indian brigade soldiers and the locals, have all helped to restore normalcy to the region. Today, market activity in all the major townships has once again become vibrant and the number of internally displaced persons has decreased.

² <http://www.un.org/secureworld/>.

³ <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/chap3.htm>.

Major General Rajender Singh: “The Experience of UNMEE”

Two observations, derived from the experience of the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), offer lessons for other peacekeeping missions. First, to prevent a reversion to war, peacekeeping and peace-building activities must be conducted not sequentially, but rather concurrently. Second, while regional organizations will not likely replace the UN as the central actor in international peace operations, they can still play a vital role in helping to resolve conflicts within their respective regions.

Ethiopia and Eritrea are both strategically located in the Horn of Africa. IN 1993, after a period of insurgency, Eritrea split from Ethiopia and formed a separate state. The next five years were a period of relative peace between the two states. In 1998, however, hostilities broke out, prompting UNMEE’s creation and deployment. To date, two factors have been instrumental in that mission’s success. First, peace-building processes were given sufficient time to bring stability and security to the area. Once the local populations had a chance to experience peace, they acted as pressure brokers against those who threatened to return the region to war. Second, the African Union (AU) played a critical role in creating the initial diplomatic space necessary for negotiating an end to the conflict.

Nonetheless, lingering uncertainties about UNMEE’s future success raises several questions that are relevant to other conflicts. Are our current peacekeeping and peace-building strategies sufficient for dealing with these conflicts? More specifically, are we doing enough to ensure that such conflicts are not conducive to the emergence of terrorism? Are we making effective use of all actors available for peace operations, including regional organizations and civil society actors?

Four types of actors are instrumental in the outbreak of violence: 1) state and non-state armed groups; 2) behind-the-scenes players (both overt and covert) with interests other than peace; 3) the wider populations in the affected countries; and 4) the conflict’s financial backers. A peace agreement requires the agreement of at least two of these main actors, but others must also be involved in putting pressure on the conflicting parties. This is precisely where our current approaches are lacking. Bringing an end to violent conflict requires not merely neutralizing armed groups, since they can quite easily return to conflict, but marginalizing and/or reintegrating them into society.

In this regard, regional organizations can supplement the work of UN missions in three ways. First, because these organizations have high stakes in their region’s security, they can apply political pressure to the various parties and neutralize the impact of other ‘behind-the-scenes’ players. Chapter 7 missions are well equipped for dealing with the spoilers of peace, but they cannot tackle well-organized combatants. Regional organizations can thus also play a role in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes and in strengthening the governing institutions of the affected state. Second, regional organizations can mobilize the capability to respond to crises far more quickly than can UN missions. Third, in the event that UN troops must withdraw from a mission, regional organizations can assist with the withdrawal process.

In conclusion, a lasting peace requires two things: gradual withdrawal and an early start to peace-building activities. Rather than treating peacekeeping and peace-building as separate activities, we must instead think about how to enhance the peace-building capability of peacekeeping missions, and how to enhance the peacekeeping element of peace-building missions. How can peacekeeping do more to address the human element, and how can peace-building do more to address the problem of spoilers?

Mr. John McFarlane – “Regional Capacity Building and Policing Experience in the South Pacific”

Australia currently has 13 bilateral agreements with neighboring countries that focus on the prevention of terrorism and transnational crime (TNC). It has also helped establish TNC Units in several regional countries, including the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) and the Pacific Transnational Crime Center (PTNCC) in Fiji. Australia's current overseas deployment capacity includes an International Liaison Network of 80 officers in 30 countries, a counter-terrorist strike team of approximately 40 people in Indonesia and the Philippines, and an International Deployment Group (IDG) which has recently been authorized to expand from 550 to 1,200 officers, including a 150 man Operational Response Group to assist in dealing with the region's immediate public order issues. For a country with very limited police resources, these deployments represent a significant Australian commitment to regional stability and security. Australia sees these commitments as consistent with the *Brahimi Report*⁴, and never deploys without written request of the host government. These Australian commitments are also motivated by a concern that if Australia and New Zealand do not contribute to peace and stability in the South Pacific, no one else will, including the UN.

Australia's immediate security environment is one that comprises five disrupted states: Fiji, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, and East Timor (Timor Leste).

Fiji: Fiji was a British colony until 1970. As part of this colonial legacy, Fiji's population includes a large number of individuals of Indian descent. In 1987, the election of an Indo-Fijian government prompted two military coups. A new constitution drafted in 2000 was supposed to guarantee indigenous control of Fiji, but the election of another Indo-Fijian government in 2000 prompted yet another military coup. The Commonwealth responded by suspending Fiji's membership. Later that year, democracy was restored with the election of the Qarase government. Under this government, the Fijian police charged 556 individuals (including 122 serving military personnel and politicians) with offenses related to the 2000 coup. Some of these politicians returned to political office upon completion of their sentences. Commander Frank Bainimarama, who was nearly killed in a military mutiny linked to the 2000 coup, accused Qarase of taking a soft approach to the individuals involved. In response, Bainimarama demanded the following: the withdrawal of three bills, including the *Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill* proposed by Qarase; the sacking of Australian-born Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes; and the cessation of police investigations into alleged military sedition.

On November 29, 2006, 2,000 Fijian soldiers and reservists 'locked down' Suva and warned against foreign military intervention. Hughes took refuge in the Australian High Commission and was later directed by Qarase to return to Australia due to death threats to the Commissioner and his family. All Pacific Island Forum (PIF) Foreign Ministers (except Tonga) met in Sydney on December 1st under the *Biketawa Declaration*.⁵ This Declaration allows for intervention in a member state if such an intervention is requested by that government. There will be no foreign intervention in Fiji, but a PIF Eminent Persons Group will try to negotiate a settlement.

Qarase has promised freedom of information laws, an anti-corruption commission, and a review of pay and conditions for the military. He also stated that he would not oppose the suspension of police investigations into Bainimarama and into alleged sedition by members of the military. The Fijian military now seems to be assuming a political role in Fiji not unlike that of the Thai and Pakistani militaries, and Qarase seems to have capitulated. The UN Secretary-General has condemned Bainimarama's actions and UN officials have indicated that if the coup plans proceed, Fiji's future participation in UN peacekeeping operations will be called into question. On December 5th Bainimarama initiated a "peaceful coup", declared himself President, and placed Qarase under house arrest.

⁴ http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.

⁵ <http://www.geocities.com/pacpoc2003/docs/Biketawa.PDF>.

Tonga: After the death of King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV in September 2006, his son, H.M George Tupou V assumed power. Tupou subsequently announced that he would divest himself of his extensive private business interests. The King, his family, some powerful nobles, and a growing non-royal elite class has enjoyed considerable wealth while rest of the country lives in relative poverty. There is a strong pro-democracy movement in Tonga calling for improvements in official accountability and better representation in Parliament. The monarchy itself is not under challenge, but the late King had been accused of squandering millions in bad investments and of undertaking questionable business practices, including a costly and fruitless search for oil (against professional advice), a proposal to make Tonga a nuclear waste disposal site, selling Tongan Protected Persons passports, registering foreign ships (some of which were engaged in illegal activities), contributing to the collapse of the Royal Tongan Airlines, and alleged criminal connections in building of an airport hotel and casino. The Tongan government has also imprisoned pro-democracy leaders and has attempted to "Tonganise" the press through selective licensing and by limiting the press's freedoms in order to protect the monarchy's image.

In November, rioting broke out in Nuku'alofa when it became apparent that the Tongan Parliament would adjourn for a year without making any improvements in democracy. Government buildings, offices and shops (including Chinese owned stores) were subsequently looted and burned, which ultimately resulted in six deaths. Australia and New Zealand sent 150 police and military personnel to assist. The military personnel have since withdrawn. Approximately 64 Australian and New Zealand police officers remain, but will soon be withdrawn.

Solomon Islands: Following the election of Bartholomew Ulufa'alu as Prime Minister in 1997, the Solomon Islands' political situation, quality of governance and police performance all deteriorated. Ulufa'alu requested Australian assistance in 2000, but Australia turned down his request. In June of that year, an insurrection by Malaitan militants forced Ulufa'alu's brief detention and resignation at gunpoint. He was replaced with the election of Manasseh Sogavare. Guadalcanal militants retaliated by trying to drive the Malaitans out of Guadalcanal.

In December 2002 Sir Alan Kamakesa was elected Prime Minister, but he was unable to reverse the further deterioration of law and order and the increase in widespread violence and extortion. Kamakeza sought Australian assistance under the terms of the *Biketawa Declaration*. Australia convened a meeting of the PIF and obtained unanimous support for a regional deployment to the Solomon Islands. In July 2003, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) deployed with 2,200 police, troops and other advisers from 20 countries.⁶ RAMSI is characterized as being: preventive, permissive, regional in nature, nationally led, supported by the United Nations, non-sovereign, police led, and light in touch

In April 2006, the Solomon Islands held another round of national elections that resulted in the election of Snyder Rini as Prime Minister. Soon after, Rini was accused of using bribes from Chinese businessmen to buy the votes of Members of Parliament. The Taipei government was also implicated in this influence buying. The rioting that resulted led to the destruction of most of Honiara's Chinatown. China evacuated hundreds of Chinese, and Australia and New Zealand deployed additional troops and police. Rini resigned following a vote of no confidence, and Sogavare, a long-term critic of RAMSI, was elected the new Prime Minister.

The following month Sogavare appointed to the Cabinet two Members of Parliament who were then in custody for their alleged role in inciting the Honiara riots. In September, he expelled Patrick Cole, the Australian High Commissioner in Honiara, for allegedly "meddling in local affairs". Sogavare then appointed Julian Moti, an Australian lawyer of Indo-Fijian background, as the new Solomon Islands Attorney General. Moti, who was wanted by the AFP for child sex offences, was arrested in Port Moresby and released on bail. He fled to the Solomon Islands High

⁶ RAMSI's current participating countries include: Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. See www.ramsi.org.

Commission and was subsequently flown to the Solomon Islands on a PNG (Papua New Guinea) Defence Force aircraft. PNG Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare denied any knowledge of or authorization for this flight. Somare subsequently suspended three senior defence/defence force officers for their roles in abetting Moti's escape. Upon his arrival in the Solomon Islands, RAMSI police arrested Moti on immigration offences. He has reportedly offered to return to Australia in connection with his case. The Solicitor-General (an Australian) left Honiara in October, accusing Sogavare of bullying the courts and undermining the rule of law.

While Sogavare was attending the PIF meeting in Fiji in October, the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) and RAMSI raided the Prime Minister's office to search for evidence pertinent to the Moti case. Sogavare has since tried to remove the Commissioners of both the RSIP and the RAMSI Participating Police Force (PPF). He persuaded the Heads of Government of the 16 PIF countries to review Australia's role in RAMSI. PNG's Prime Minister sided with Sogavare in the PIF meeting, criticizing the "heavy-handed approaches that have little regard for the social and cultural sensitivities of the local situation." Political tensions in the Solomon Islands remain high.

Papua New Guinea: The Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) is a capacity building mission for assisting and providing resources to the Royal PNG Constabulary (RPNGC). It was established in December 2003 by bilateral ministerial agreement and this action was endorsed by the PNG Parliament in July 2004. It was proposed that up to 210 Australian police would deploy in stages and occupy in-line positions to assist and mentor RPNGC personnel. The first personnel deployed to Bougainville in early September, and deployment to Port Moresby began in October 2004.

In May 2005, following a challenge to the PNG Supreme Court by the Governor of Morobe Province, the Court decided unanimously that in spite of the bilateral agreement reached between the Governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea, the ECP conflicted with the PNG Constitution. According to this decision, legal immunities granted to Australian police officers to protect them from prosecution under PNG law were ruled unconstitutional. It also ruled that Australian police had no legal authority to exercise police powers or to carry firearms in PNG. Australian police immediately stood down and were withdrawn, pending a review of the ECP Act. Discussions have taken place between the two Governments concerning the possibility of redeploying a small number of AFP officers in an ECP advisory role, but the decision and any deployment has been delayed due to the dispute over the Moti affair.

Timor Leste (East Timor): In October 2005, the Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR)⁷ was delivered to East Timorese President Xanana Gusmao. The Report claimed that over 100,000 Timorese died between April 1974 and October 1999 as a result of the Indonesian occupation. It also claimed that human rights violations on both sides were "massive, widespread and systematic" and that the crimes committed in 1999 constituted a systematic campaign orchestrated at the highest levels of the Indonesian government. In January 2006, the report was delivered to UN Secretary-General. The following month, Presidents Gusmao and (Indonesian) President Yudhoyono agreed to set the Report aside and focus on the work of the alternative Truth and Friendship Commission.

The TLPDP (Timor Leste Police Development Program) commenced in August 2003. It was jointly sponsored by Australia, the UK, and given in-kind support by East Timor government. The TLPDP was jointly staffed by AusAID contractors and the International Deployment Group (IDG) of the AFP. While active, it had four main components: (1) preventing crime and ensuring community safety; (2) conducting investigations and operations; (3) training and development; and (4) administration, oversight and strategy. Its overall goal was the maintenance of a safe and stable environment in East Timor and support for social and economic development and sustainable poverty reduction. Its specific purpose was to strengthen the capacity of the East

⁷ <http://www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/>.

Timor Police Service (PNTL) to effectively and professionally maintain law and order with full respect for human rights. The TLPDP was suspended following the Dili riots in May 2006.

Several factors compound effective policing in East Timor. First, instability and violence, most notably the profound trauma of 1999, devastated much of the country's infrastructure. That trauma and has not been adequately reconciled at either official or societal levels. Second, the majority of the population speaks the lingua franca, Tetum, but Portuguese, spoken by only 3% of the population, is the official language. Furthermore, East Timor's criminal code is written in Bahasa Indonesia, and English is the regional and business language. Third, most of the country's current political leadership was overseas between 1975 and 1999. These leaders are considered aloof, arrogant, and authoritarian in not addressing key problems such as poverty, unemployment, and alienation. Fourth, the military's role is still uncertain and there is a great deal of tension between the military and the police. The PNTL was regarded by some as politicized and unduly compliant to the Alkatiri Government. It was also comprised of young and inexperienced members in comparison to most of the members of the military (F-FDTL), many of whom were former Falintil (East Timorese resistance) fighters. Finally, disputes within the military over the conditions of service and alleged discrimination led to the dismissal of 600 military personnel. In the tension following this action by the Alkatiri Government, tensions between the F-FDTL and the PNTL led to violence, exploited by street gangs and martial arts groups.

On May 25, 2006, individuals wearing military uniforms carried out a massacre outside police headquarters. The massacre rendered the East Timor police ineffective and it ceased operating in Dili. Gusmao and Ramos-Horta called for foreign intervention to which (former) Prime Minister Alkatiri reluctantly agreed. Military personnel from Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia were deployed to East Timor, as were police from Australia, New Zealand and Portugal. The Minister of the Interior, Rogerio Lobato, was subsequently placed under house arrest in connection with allegations that he had illegally raised and armed a private 'hit squad' to intimidate or assassinate political opponents of the Government. Alkatiri, who was not known to be directly involved in this conspiracy, subsequently resigned and was replaced by Jose Ramos-Horta as Interim Prime Minister.

Some of the findings of the UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor Leste⁸ in October 2006 included the following: (1) the East Timorese government was not proactive in addressing national security problems, including the military-police tensions; (2) the government did not follow legislative procedures in calling the military out; (3) operational planning and response by the police was deficient; (4) the abandonment of his post by the police's General Commander on May 24, 2006 was a serious dereliction of duty; (5) the Commander of the Defence Force (F-FDTL) failed to prevent the confrontation between the police and military, but he was not responsible for it; (6) there was a lack of control over weapons and ammunition, especially within the police; (7) the former Prime Minister did not use his authority to denounce the transfer of weapons to civilians.

The Commission's further recommendations include: (1) several individuals should be prosecuted for criminal activity; (2) additional people, including former Prime Minister Alkatiri, should be further investigated; (3) state officials involved in the events of April and May 2006 should be subject to disciplinary measures; (4) robust and independent police and military oversight mechanisms should be established, including investigations of complaints of police and military misconduct; (5) criminal cases should be handled within the East Timorese judicial system, and where a panel is involved under the Criminal Procedure Code, that panel should comprise one national and two international judges; (6) the resources and capacity of the criminal justice system, including the courts and the Office of the Prosecutor-General, should be enhanced.

The Future: The UN will now re-engage in East Timor under UNSC Resolution 1704. Military peacekeepers will gradually be replaced by up to 1,600 civilian police under the new UN

⁸ <http://www.ohchr.org/english/docs/ColReport-English.pdf>.

mandate. The TLPDP's future will be considered within the context of these changes, but Australia is likely to continue to play a major role through the Australian Federal Police in building the capacity of the East Timor police. Revenues from off-shore oil facilities will begin to flow in 2007, but the government has yet to address some basic social, economic, and political problems such as reconciliation, persistent unemployment, weak or nonexistent infrastructure, health and education services, rebuilding trust with the community, and reconsidering foreign relations, including aid coordination.

Australia has not deployed military or police to the region without a written request from the host government. The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) and AFP are currently developing joint doctrine and practice. Australian police deployments in regional emergency circumstances have been very rapid (RAMSI within 12 hours; East Timor within 48 hours; and Tonga also within 48 hours).

In terms of the lessons learned, it has become increasingly clear that Australia and possibly even New Zealand initially underestimated the political complexities of East Timor and South Pacific states. Planning and execution of missions has been reasonably sound, but youth unemployment, disenchantment, entrenched internal political tensions and endemic corruption has made these tasks very difficult. Furthermore, competition for diplomatic recognition between Beijing and Taipei has complicated matters even further. Experience has suggested that greater regional involvement in missions such as the ECP might be an advantage; also, prior and following embarkation, the ECP members would benefit from more detailed briefings on the culture, languages, history, law and politics of the area of operations to facilitate their relationship with the local community.

Discussion

(1) With respect to where peacekeeping should end and peace-building should begin, we should consider this question in a historical context. While he was UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined the process as one of four stages: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building. But this reflected a tendency toward compartmentalized thinking that was prevalent at the time. According to the logic of this thinking, the peacemaking process could begin whether the UN was involved or not. Once peacemaking succeeded, the peacekeeping process could then be implemented. During the implementation phase, humanitarian assistance began. Humanitarian assistance was provided not just by the UN, but also by NGOs. At this stage, humanitarian actors interacted with peacekeepers. Once it was determined that the local population was no longer suffering, the humanitarian assistance phase ended and peace-building could begin.

In the end, however, this model of sequential stages was unsuccessful, as was made evident by the many failures of peacekeeping missions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. We should thus endorse the idea that peace-building activities should start from the very beginning of a mission. Post-conflict peace-building includes development, rehabilitation, and reconstruction work done by specialized agencies such as UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization), the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), and other agencies during the humanitarian phase. From a bureaucratic and UN point of view, these are separate from peacekeeping, but on the ground, we should not think this way.

(2) The UN Charter confers on the UN, especially the Security Council, the responsibility to maintain international peace and security. But the Security Council does not act as a group. Instead, it is controlled by certain powers that act in their own interests. An extreme example is when the US acted alone in invading Iraq when it could not get Security Council approval. The tendency toward acting in one's own political interests is not limited to the Security Council's

Permanent Five members⁹ since other non-permanent members also make decision based on how they themselves might be impacted.

(3) The material limitations of global institutions, specifically the UN, are becoming very apparent. This does not simply refer to a shortage of military resources, but also a shortage of police and other civilian personnel. Given these shortages, the Security Council cannot simply pass new peacekeeping missions and expect that they will be adequately resourced.

(4) The UN Secretariat is not fully competent in mobilizing the resources needed for the successful execution of their missions. One reason for this is nepotism, but another is the length of time it typically takes - between six and nine months - to recruit the required personnel. Furthermore, there are questions about who should fund these missions. The Security Council passes many new missions, while the US at the same time withholds its funding for the UN. This sort of hypocrisy creates reluctance for developing countries to pay their own dues.

(5) Regarding the role of regional organizations, the UN encourages a role for these organizations through the language of Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. The African Union (AU), for example, has intentions to take on a more robust role, and is showing some initial promise in that regard, but it is also trying to do so in a region beset by conflict, and trying to do so without the adequate resources. Regional organizations like this need and deserve more support from the international community. In Latin America, the Organization of American States (OAS), played an important role in the resolution of the conflict in Haiti, but still has some critical limitations. South Asia and Southeast Asia are both regions with some organizational arrangements (the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, or SAARC, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, respectively), but those organizations do not really play a role in peacekeeping. Some make the argument that regional organizations know the political dynamics and complexities within their own regions better than do extra-regional actors. Nonetheless, regional organizations are not by themselves more effective than the UN.

Session Two: The Interplay of Actors in the Region: NGOs and Regional Organizations

Mr. Stephan Sakalian: "ICRC: Multilateral Affairs in Asia"

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an impartial, neutral, and independent international humanitarian organization. Its mission is to assist those suffering the effects of conflicts and armed violence. Today, the ICRC maintains an operational presence in nearly all contexts of peace support operations (PSO). In Asia, the ICRC has been active in contexts such as Cambodia, East Timor, Aceh and Kashmir. From these experiences, it has developed significant expertise on carrying out humanitarian action and applying international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law in various situations.¹⁰ The ICRC is not an NGO or regional organization, but its experiences can offer valuable lessons for other actors in PSO.

The ICRC's goals in the Asia Pacific region include developing stronger relations with the region's multilateral forums at both the Track One (for instance with ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and Track Two levels (with ASEAN-ISIS and the CSCAP network), in particular with those involved in security and humanitarian issues, including debates on PSO. The ICRC claims to more actively contribute to the growing number of debates on humanitarian and security issues and to better understand Asian regional particularities.

⁹ The UN Security Council's Permanent Five members are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China.

¹⁰ For the ICRC's summary of the sources, content and field application of international humanitarian law, see <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/humanitarian-law-factsheet>.

Contacts with ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have been fruitful in this regard. In 2001, after an ARF-ICRC seminar on the relevance of IHL in PSO, the ARF declared IHL a Confidence Building Measure. More recently, the ICRC was invited to present its activities related to Police Forces' Human Rights training at the 5th ASEAN Senior Officials' Meeting. These new efforts at the regional level complement those carried out within the framework of ICRC's usual activities with armed and security forces in the region, including in the field of PSO. These activities include cooperation with the region's peacekeeping centers and pre-deployment briefings for forces involved in PSO (including troops from India, Nepal, Thailand, and police forces from Malaysia).

In 2007, the ICRC will continue to deepen this engagement with the region. For the coming year, the following events are planned: an ICRC-Malaysian Armed Forces joint regional event in Kuala Lumpur on the applicability of IHL in PSO, and an ICRC-Asia Pacific Center for Military Law joint regional event called "Law Enforcement in Peacekeeping Operations: Training Options for Civilian Policing". The outcome of the latter conference is to contribute to the regional brainstorming on this particular topic, to produce a report on the training needs, and to possibly promote a pilot training course.

Mr. Larry Maybee: "ICRC: Regional Legal Adviser for South Asia"

The ICRC is not an NGO, but a private international organization whose fundamental principles are impartiality, neutrality, independence, humanity, voluntary service, unity, and universality. Its legal mandate, provided by the Geneva Conventions¹¹ and ratified by every state in the world, grants the ICRC the right to operate in conflict areas. The ICRC works in close proximity to victims, maintains dialogue with all parties and actors, coordinates with other components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, and acts in a way that complements the work of other humanitarian agencies. Its overall activities include: (1) providing protection in conflicts: protecting prisoners of war, other detainees, and civilians and restoring family links; (2) providing assistance to conflict victims: food, water, habitat, and other material assistance, economic rehabilitation, and medical care (war surgery, public health, orthopedic limb-fitting); and (3) engaging in preventive action, including promotion of IHL. The ICRC's two major challenges in performing these activities are gaining access to the victims and ensuring respect for IHL.

Specific Issues of Cooperation: Because the military provides security in conflict situations, it typically wants to assume a lead role. This is inconsistent, however, with the ICRC's special mandate and the fundamental principles that govern its operations. Furthermore, the ICRC's particular mandate is determined not by military actors, but by the context in which it is operating. In cases of intra-state (non-international) conflict, the ICRC must seek the consent of the state, but does not require the consent of the UN or other regional organizations operating within that context. While the ICRC may engage in dialogue with these other actors, it does not require their formal agreement to be there.

As a general rule, the ICRC does not use military assets because of potential problems caused by simultaneous dual use. The ICRC also does not use armed escorts or guards, as that could jeopardize its neutrality, impartiality and independence; ultimately, this could prevent access to victims on both sides of the conflict. The exceptions are cases of last resort, such as in conditions of banditry and lawlessness. (Somalia and Chechnya are two recent examples.)

The UN Secretary-General's Bulletin of August 6th, 1999 (Section 9.9) states "The United Nations force shall facilitate the work of relief operations which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, and shall respect personnel, vehicles and premises involved in such operations."¹²

¹¹ <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/genevaconventions>.

¹² http://www.un.org/peace/st_sgb_1999_13.pdf.

Challenges to Civil-Military Relations: Civil-military relations in conflict situations are complicated by their respective objectives and approaches, which may not always be in harmony. Humanitarian organizations are present in conflict situations in order to provide needs-based assistance, whereas the military is operating there to further a particular mission or mandate. Moreover, the military and peacekeeping operations in general are not necessarily neutral and/or apolitical. In practice, military actors are often forced to side with one of the parties to a conflict, which contradicts the ICRC's position of being neutral, impartial and independent in all situations.

The humanitarian environment has also become more competitive with a proliferation of NGO and UN actors encroaching upon service areas the ICRC has traditionally seen as its own (such as detainee visitations, for example). This is not to say that these other actors are not performing effectively in these roles. Indeed, many of these actors can apply political pressure through public statements, activities in which the ICRC is very limited. Overall, however, the ICRC's position is that duplication of services is not the most effective way to deliver humanitarian assistance.

In addition, the lines between war fighting and humanitarian action are becoming blurred. This is especially evident in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. For example, there is now pressure on armed forces to assume a role in reconstruction and other humanitarian work. Not only does this potentially cause confusion for those on the ground, but it may also create a situation in which these two types of actors may actually be working at cross-purposes.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): DDR programs should be part of an "overall integrated recovery strategy" that includes fostering peace and stability, supporting economic development, addressing humanitarian concerns, and fostering justice and reconciliation. It also includes the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs of countries in post-conflict situations. The peace-building (peace-consolidating) process is typically led by the UN, but regional and sub-regional organizations such as the AU and the Economic Community of African States (ECOWAS) have also been actively engaged in settling conflicts in their regions.

The ICRC's position on DDR is not fully developed, but it does have an internal doctrine and guidelines on DDR. Although the ICRC is clearly smaller and has a more limited budget than the UN, there are still some areas where it can have a positive impact. This includes offering its good offices to act as a neutral intermediary at the request of all parties concerned. While the ICRC cannot negotiate peace agreements or cease fires, it can facilitate agreements between parties and can contribute to the implementation of agreements. Whether or not the ICRC becomes involved in DDR depends on the context. Because disarmament is a military function, the ICRC should not play any direct role in this phase. It can, however, advocate for weapons collection and destruction and assist in de-mining operations.

In the Demobilization phase, the ICRC should pay particular attention to the most vulnerable groups, such as children, women, foreigners, the wounded and sick, the war disabled, and arms carriers in detention. In the Reintegration phase, the ICRC emphasizes the importance of granting amnesties for mere participation in negotiations. But it also advocates fighting impunity through the prosecution of war crimes, and supports the rights of victims to accountability, justice, and acknowledgement. While the ICRC is not interested in punishing offenders, it also wants to prevent future violations.

Conclusion: The ICRC is active in PSO contexts because its mandate is to respond to the humanitarian consequences of armed conflict or other situations of violence. The ICRC is often present before, during and after a conflict or a situation of violence. In order to carry out its mandate, it develops dialogue with all arms carriers, and therefore also with peacekeeping troops if they are present. This dialogue aims to provide access to victims of armed conflict and violence, and to guarantee the safety of ICRC staff.

Given their respective missions and mandates, the ICRC and arms carriers share the same operational space and are bound to meet regularly. Dialogue between the ICRC and other actors

in PSO is thus indispensable in order to coordinate their activities. Nonetheless, the ICRC has learned that the applicable legal framework will depend on the situation on the ground, rather than on the mandate given to the PSO troops (i.e. Mandates under chapters VI or VII of the UN Charter are not determinative of the application of IHL).

What are the lessons learned? Because PSOs are multi-national by nature, they raise challenges of legal inter-operability. These challenges become even more acute when peacekeeping units below the battalion level are comprised of different nationalities operating under different legal frameworks. This is especially troubling for commanders when they must figure out which law applies to the situation. This is currently the case, for example, with KFOR (Kosovo) and UNIFIL (Liberia). The question thus arises as to what standards and procedures apply for weapons, armed personnel, and detainees. Because different standards of training, including pre-deployment training, also impact inter-operability and effectiveness, these standards should be clear set out in the pre-deployment stage.

Mr. Sakalian concluded the session with seven recommendations on the ICRC's behalf:

First, military personnel should complement the work of humanitarian organizations in PSO by ensuring the safety of humanitarian workers and access for humanitarian assistance. For effective coordination, cooperation and constant exchange of information is required.

Second, states providing PSO troops for should ensure that all concerned military personnel are familiar with the roles and mandates of the ICRC and of other humanitarian organizations. In particular, they should be aware that the ICRC, on the basis of its fundamental principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, will engage and coordinate its humanitarian responses with other actors involved in PSO, but cannot be coordinated by them.

Third, regardless of the type of PSO (UN mandated or otherwise), the states providing troops for PSO should ensure that all concerned military personnel receive training in and respect for the applicable law, as defined by the situation on the ground (international human rights law, IHL, human rights law, and domestic law). This should be reflected in all orders and instructions, including rules of engagement.

Fourth, the UN and other regional bodies involved in PSO should insist on training in IHL and human rights as a prerequisite for participation in any PSO. Common minimum standards in these areas should be developed for all Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) to use, including through the existing network of national peacekeeping centers.

Fifth, the requirement for compliance with IHL and human rights law must be reflected in the legislation, orders, instructions, and directives of all TCN. This must include measures for enforcement, including establishing jurisdiction over offenders and effective sanctions for violence.

Sixth, the relevant applicable law for each PSO must be incorporated by all TCN into their doctrine, education and training and should be supported by an effective sanctions system. This process must happen prior to deployment. A top-down driven process involving the highest levels in the chain of command must be in place in order for lawful behavior to become second nature.

Seventh, the ICRC shares the ground with PSO forces in many contexts. The ICRC wishes to pursue and develop dialogue with these forces at each stage of a PSO – during the mandate's deployment, prior to deployment of forces, during operations, and after deployment. It stands ready to participate in pre-deployment briefings (by presenting its operations in the recipient country as well as its legal reading of the humanitarian situation) and post-action reviews.

Discussion

(1) The ICRC's approach was quite state-centric, which is understandable since it is the guardian of IHL and thus emphasizes the upholding of the law. But what about cases of failed or failing states with no legal governing entity? How do you convince ruling militias to abide by these laws?

Mr. Maybee: IHL is less well developed for these types of situations of intra-state (non-international) conflict. Mechanisms of enforcement are problematic while a conflict is ongoing and in many cases, only Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies. The tools for dealing with these non-state actors are thus quite limited in treaty law. There is always customary law, however, and there may be other rules (i.e., domestic law and human rights) that remain applicable in these intra-state contexts.

Mr. Sakalian: It is important to underline that in many operational contexts and whenever the situation allows it, the ICRC is also engaged in a dialogue with non-state actors such as opposition groups. This has been the case for many years in countries such as Colombia and the Philippines.

(2) A few years ago, the ICRC was actively engaged in the application of IHL to peace operations. Eventually, however, the ICRC realized that since the UN is composed of individual states, the UN as a body can not take responsibility for applying IHL to their forces in peace operations. The UN issued guidelines for this, however, in a UN Secretary-General Bulletin of August 1999.

(3) The ICRC was given consent by the Indian government for its role in Jammu and Kashmir. But Nepal is an internal conflict, so what is the justification for the ICRC's presence there?

Mr. Sakalian: In the case of a non-international conflict, Article 3 common to the four Conventions and Protocol II (when ratified) apply. In common Article 3, sometimes considered as "a treaty in miniature," it is stated that "an impartial body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict."

(4) Regarding the safety of humanitarian workers, in the former Yugoslavia some NGOs pursued their own agendas in areas they were warned were not secure. In part, they had to do this to convince their donors that they were fulfilling their mandates. But when they found themselves imperiled, they requested the UN's assistance to rescue them. These types of situations create for commanders serious dilemmas that are perhaps not well understood by the NGO community. A commander has troops at his disposal in order to fulfill a particular mandate. But in cases like the one just mentioned, that commander must ask his troops to put their lives at risk for something that should not have happened in the first place.

Mr. Sakalian: The security of humanitarian workers and access to the victims is indeed one of the most serious challenges to humanitarian action in situations of conflict, as currently seen in contexts like Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. The ICRC takes very seriously all security-related matters and in recent years has developed a new security concept aimed at reducing the risks on the field to a minimum. To this end, exchange of information between various actors such as the military, local communities, and aid organizations is vital. However, 'zero risk situations' do not exist in conflict areas and even the best security rules cannot prevent all security incidents. But if one takes into account the scope of ICRC activities, with thousands of expatriates and local personnel in the field on a daily basis in over 60 countries, such instances are in fact quite rare. The ICRC operates according to fairly tight security rules; if it knows the situation is unsafe, it will withdraw. In some areas of Iraq, for example, many operations are conducted only by remote control. In Chechnya, the ICRC did not enter some areas without military escort due to such safety concerns.

(5) What is the basis for arguing that the UN is political and not neutral? The ICRC's perception that UN peacekeeping troops do not stand for neutrality should be modified since blue helmets signal a neutrality that provides UN troops their greatest protection.

Mr. Sakalian: The comment about the UN's non-neutrality was not an insinuation that the UN is intentionally partial. It was, rather, a suggestion that some actors on the field with whom the ICRC must be in dialogue perceive UN troops and observers as part of a political agenda. For the ICRC, the issue is thus not one of not trusting UN peacekeeping troops, but rather a need to disassociate themselves in order to avoid being perceived as part of a political mission.

Mr. Maybee: It is not necessarily the case that UN peacekeeping forces politically favor one side over the other, but some actors with whom the ICRC must be in dialogue may perceive UN mandates as 'political' in nature.

In the field, the ICRC conducts its own security assessments and would not willingly place its own people in harm's way. This assessment and the decisions upon which it is based are conducted with concern for security in the forefront of its thinking. The validity of these assessments depends on dialogue, including exchanging information, sharing assessments of the security situation, and taking and giving advice accordingly. There needs to be recognition that the work of humanitarian organizations is legitimate and indispensable, but from a commander's point of view, there are of course legitimate concerns that could be better managed.

(6) The ICRC says it does not consider disarmament to be part of its mandate because that is a military activity and is thus inconsistent with its mission, but the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) has been quite successful in conducting this activity. Furthermore, with respect to the ICRC's role as a potential mediator in conflicts one lesson the AMM has learned is that in order to successfully implement a positive peace, the negotiators and facilitators must carry a certain political weight. In Aceh, two previous peace agreements failed because they did not have the adequate political weight to make the parties reaffirm their commitments to peace.¹³

(7) The current meeting was happening within close proximity of two ongoing conflicts: Nepal and Kashmir. To date, the UN is only considering deploying 35 monitors to Nepal by the end of the year, and only then will it consider whether to send a mission. In the meantime, Maoist rebels are in the process of re-mobilizing themselves. Where are the regional actors with respect to Nepal? It has been mentioned here that regional actors could play a role where the UN or other international actors do not. Regional actors can be blamed for their involvement, but with the AMM, the participation of the ASEAN Five has been essential to the mission's credibility.

Mr. Sakalian: Regarding the ICRC potentially playing a 'neutral intermediary role', this reference was not necessarily to peace negotiations since the ICRC does not play a peacemaking role. In certain contexts, it can, however, play a role in facilitating sensitive processes between the conflicting parties, such as exchange of prisoners, release of kidnapped persons or repatriation of dead bodies. The question here is not really one of who has the political weight to do this, but rather one of who is an acceptable actor to do it for all the parties.

(8) On the matter of Nepal and Kashmir, Kashmir is part of the War against Terror, and as far as intervention is concerned, the Indian government's position is quite clear: the UN is neither configured nor envisaged to be the policeman of the world. With respect to the issue of the UN sending 35 personnel to Nepal, the basic intention of the UN is to keep that mandate very limited in scope.

¹³ <http://www.aceh-mm.org/>.

Session Three: ASEAN and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Future Prospects and Lessons for Asia

Mr. Omar Halim: "ASEAN and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Future Prospects and Lessons for Asia"

While recognizing that individual countries have made direct contributions to the UN in peacekeeping and peace-building efforts around the world, this Study Group has attempted to evaluate how, and in what form, the countries of Asia and the Pacific could undertake a regional effort to restore and maintain peace and security in their own region. Indeed, the UN has stated in its Charter that "nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangement or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with Purposes and Principles of the United Nations" (Article 52.1). Furthermore, "the Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlements of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council" (Article 52.2) and, finally, "the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council" (Article 52.3). The UN Security Council thus in principle defers to regional arrangements to maintain international peace and security in their regions.

The Development of ASEAN Objectives on Strengthening Regional Security: Within the Asia Pacific region, the most concrete regional arrangement is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has developed over a 40 year period. It should be recalled that in the 1950s and 1960s, Southeast Asian states had just emerged from the yoke of colonialism and were searching for and forming their respective national identities. In this context, the idea of forming a regional entity comprising of the various ethnic, social and political groupings, was not an easy one to implement. In 1967, ASEAN's founders chose, foremost, to develop confidence among their respective countries and to focus on cooperating in the economic, social and cultural fields through "joint endeavors" and "active collaboration and mutual assistance" (these and the following quotations have been taken from articles published by the ASEAN Secretariat in <http://www.aseansec.org/328.htm>). At that time, they made "no impassioned call for ASEAN members to take common political position".

Although "security concerns and political purposes were never far from the ASEAN founders' intentions", only in 1976 did ASEAN issue a Declaration of ASEAN Concord in which, for the first time, member states indicated their intention to expand political cooperation. The program of action called for holding ASEAN summits; settling intraregional disputes; improving the ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation; studying how to develop judicial cooperation, including the possibility of an ASEAN extradition treaty; and strengthening political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating positions and, where possible and desirable, taking common action.

ASEAN member countries also signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)¹⁴, which spelled out the basic principles for their relations with one another and the conduct of ASEAN's program of cooperation. These included:

- (a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
- (b) The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, and coercion;

¹⁴ <http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm>.

- (c) Noninterference in the internal affairs of one another;
- (d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
- (e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
- (f) Effective cooperation among themselves.

TAC is a treaty to which other Southeast Asian countries could accede and with which non-regional countries could associate themselves. The treaty provides for a code of conduct for the peaceful settlement of disputes. It also mandates the establishment of a High Council, comprising ministerial representatives from the parties as a dispute-settlement mechanism.

Also in 1976, the ASEAN Secretariat was established.

After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN leaders declared that “ASEAN shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity”. The new environment presented the opportunity for the relaxation of tensions in the region through confidence building, multilateral consultations and the prevention of conflict. Therefore, ASEAN and its dialogue partners decided to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) with two main objectives: (a) to foster constructive dialogue and consultations and political and security issues, and (b) to contribute towards confidence building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. In this latter context, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN stated in 1994 that “ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific”. Finally, ARF has gradually extended its focus on three broad stages: (a) the promotion of confidence building among participants; (b) the development of preventive diplomacy and (c) the elaboration of approaches to conflicts.

In 2003, ASEAN adopted a Declaration of ASEAN Concord II that stipulated the establishment of an ASEAN Community, comprising (a) an ASEAN Security Community, (b) an ASEAN Economic Community and (c) an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.¹⁵ The ASEAN Security Community would be based on “shared norms and rules of good conduct in interstate relations: effective conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms; and post-conflict peace building activities” (based on “ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action” published by the ASEAN Secretariat in <http://www.aseansec.org/16827.htm>).

In order to prevent conflict, the following areas are emphasized: (a) strengthening confidence building measures among ASEAN members among which military and civilian personnel, among others, are to be used in disaster relief operations; (b) strengthening preventive measure; (c) strengthening the ASEAN Regional Forum process, in which the ARF is to move to the “preventive diplomacy stage and beyond”; (d) enhancing cooperation on non-traditional security issues; (e) strengthening efforts in maintaining respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of member countries and (f) strengthening cooperation to address threats and challenges posed by separatism.

To resolve conflicts, ASEAN wanted to (a) strengthen dispute settlement mechanism by using modes such as negotiations and consultations, good offices, conciliation and mediation, or the use of the High Council of the TAC; (b) develop regional cooperation for the maintenance of peace and stability by, among other things, establishing a network among existing national peacekeeping centers to conduct joint planning, training, and sharing experiences to establish regional arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability and (c) develop supporting initiatives by considering, among others, establishing an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation.

For post-conflict peace-building, ASEAN needed to strengthen its humanitarian assistance capacity, including the possibility of establishing an ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center.

¹⁵ <http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm>.

It is clear that ASEAN has gone a long way, in the past four decades, to assert itself to play an important role in maintaining, and if necessary restoring peace and security in the region of Asia and the Pacific. Starting from efforts to build confidence among its member countries at the beginning, ASEAN has now indicated its preparedness to undertake, using all its mechanisms including the ARF, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building activities to maintain international peace and security in Asia and the Pacific. This is consistent with the role assigned to regional arrangements by the United Nations.

Recommendations: The ASEAN Leaders decided in December 2005 that ASEAN should take the necessary steps to enable the Association to face the challenges of the 21st century. For this purpose, they tasked an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to recommend an ASEAN Charter which “besides conferring a legal personality on ASEAN, the Charter seeks to infuse ASEAN with a renewed sense of purpose, to reaffirm and codify key objectives and key principles, to strengthen its institutions and organizational structure, and to strive to narrow the development gap, so that ASEAN can retain its role as driving force in regional dialogue and cooperation.”¹⁶ (Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, December 2006, p. 6).

In the context of the Objectives and Organizational Structure recommended by the EPG and the various decisions that ASEAN has adopted, the following recommendations regarding strengthening the capacity of ASEAN in resolving conflicts, peacekeeping and peace-building should be made:

- (a) The addition of a Peace-building and Reconstruction Program within the ASEAN Secretariat. The Peace-building component would encompass preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building activities, as deemed necessary. The Reconstruction component would encompass the humanitarian assistance envisaged as part of the post-conflict peace-building activity and the humanitarian assistance provided by ASEAN to cope with natural disasters. The organizational unit within the ASEAN Secretariat responsible for implementing this program will absorb the existing ARF Unit. The relevant governing body for this program is the EPG-proposed Council of the ASEAN Security Community.
- (b) Recognizing that South Asian countries also have extensive peacekeeping experience, in the context of the ASEAN Regional Forum, cooperation could be undertaken between ASEAN member countries, interested South Asian countries and other countries around the Pacific, such as Australia, New Zealand and perhaps Canada, to assist in the resolution of the problems being faced by the Pacific countries.

Discussion

(1) The idea of South Asian-Southeast Asian cooperation offers exciting possibilities in terms of sharing their different experiences. Where within the region might the leadership be found to move these proposed ideas forward in terms of institutional configuration? Can the ARF provide the terrain to debate the issues proposed here? What are the limits of the possible within existing regional institutional arrangements?

(2) Regarding the proposed two-program peace-building and reconstruction activities, Aceh offers possible lessons. In the post-tsunami period, the Indonesian government immediately erected a Reconstruction agency directly under the office of the Indonesian president. This agency originally coordinated post-tsunami work, and over the course of time, also became the implementing agency. But this agency had few inter-linkages with provincial government institutions. In the future, once the agency disengages, the expertise and skills that the agency

¹⁶ *Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter*, December 2006, <http://www.aseansec.org/19247.pdf> pp. 6.

brings will thus also disappear. When the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI), the reintegration of ex-combatants became imminent. For those tasks, the government established a Reintegration agency, funded partly from the same source as the Reconstruction agency. The former has been functioning rather weakly, and only with the support of international donors. Moreover, it is still not interlinked with existing provincial agencies.

Mr. Halim: The major problem with reconstruction in Aceh is institutional, and must be resolved between the Indonesian government and regional government of Aceh. It is true that the government of Indonesia pledged heavily around the time of the December 2004 tsunami, but the coordination problems was not so much a matter of central vs. regional government, but rather one of foreign vs. domestic (e.g., the UNDP and its coordinating agencies and many other NGOs).

Regarding the question of how to integrate former fighters after disarmament, this whole program should be merged with something much larger, hence, the proposal for a Center.

(3) The AMM was an interesting case because it has been driven not by the UN, but by two regional organizations: the European Union and ASEAN. Does the AMM model offer lessons about possible non-UN operations?

(4) The AMM deployed to Aceh within 12 days, in stark contrast to the 6-9 months it typically takes a UN mission to deploy.

(5) What is the status of the ASEAN Security Community? Also, with respect to how this might impact the situation in East Timor, it seems there is an agreement that the final status of the border will be delayed for approximately 25 years. In the meantime, a practical resolution gives East Timor substantially more revenue from oil resources, which should start to flow to East Timor next year and hopefully will allow it to build more capacity.

(6) Regarding joint Southeast Asia-South Asia assistance to Pacific Island states, there is a strong case for replacing the current approach, which is largely initiated by Australia and New Zealand, with a total regional approach. Given their historic links and person-to-person contacts, however, Australia and New Zealand should be integrated into the proposal being discussed. It would be wise, after all, to avoid an unhealthy competition between ASEAN and Australia/New Zealand in this area. There may be room for a collaborative approach to sharing this overall responsibility so that when things go wrong there will be different ideas and different solutions to draw from. With the exception of Fiji and PNG, most Pacific island states simply do not have the resources to be independent. We must therefore find better ways to help these states survive economically. If we look at it in a broader perspective, in the past year, Australia and New Zealand have been more closely involved in ASEAN, and this closer involvement has hopefully given the ASEAN countries a more informed view of the role that Australia and New Zealand are trying to play in that region.

Mr. Halim: Since Australia and New Zealand are regional powers with a long history of involvement with the Pacific Islands, they would certainly be included in such a proposal. The idea is to expand beyond Australia and New Zealand to include a larger grouping that may be more politically acceptable.

(7) The Pacific has 16 microstates, most of which are failed or failing, and all of which are scattered over a huge geographic area that is seen to have little impact on the rest of the world. One solution might be some type of confederation that would collectively give them more international clout. Existing animosities between some of these states, however, makes such a confederation difficult.

(8) On the question of the ASEAN Security Community, on one hand, many ASEAN leaders clearly and publicly have declared that the time has come for ASEAN as a body to be involved in peace operations. The Bali Concord, for example, has conflict prevention and resolution dimensions, as well as post-conflict reconciliation language. So how do we bridge the gap between what ASEAN formally commits and what it actually does?

Mr. Halim: With respect to confidence building measures, the idea is to have transparency and openness through the publication of white papers, for example. Now it has gone further, but only in terms of other confidence building measure and nothing beyond that. These measures will thus not likely lead to any specific military arrangements or alliances.

Saturday, December 9

Session Four: The Way Forward: Regional Peacekeeping Centers and the Development of a Regional Policy and Research Agenda

Dr. Pierre Lizee: The previous day's discussions raised several issues that include the need for reform and new thinking about the definition of (UN) Chapter 7 operations, difficulties on the ground, possibilities of regional-level initiatives in peacekeeping and peace-building, and some of the difficulties encountered by humanitarian agencies involved in peace operations. In light of these issues, what should we then propose?

Lt General (Retd) Satish Nambiar: "What are the best ways in which regional peacekeeping centers in Asia can develop institutional and research links? How can these centers develop an 'Asian' program of policy and advocacy?"

(Lt General Nambiar noted at the outset that the views he would present were his own.)

The *Brahimi Report* made clear that to develop more comprehensive and effective responses to conflicts, we need to have a more appropriate division of responsibilities between the UN and other players. How then do we look at this in an integrated framework in order to take advantage of the different capabilities and interests of regional organizations, national governments and NGOs? The prevailing view is that the UN is most effective in preventive action, traditional peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, and mediation. There is also little disagreement that regional organizations should play a larger a broader role. It initially appeared that regional organizations should focus on activities such as economic assistance, peacemaking and confidence building. With due course, however, these organizations could receive adequate preparation, training, resources, and experiences to assume a more effective role in peace operations. Six years after the *Brahimi Report*, we are in a position to reassess and review those considerations.

Until recently, enforcement actions under Chapter 7 had to be undertaken by coalitions of willing. The UN Security Council is now passing, however, missions with more robust mandates. In this context, we therefore we need to reassess and review the role of regional organizations in international peace operations. In the past, the regional organizations that have been most active in this regard have been from the developed world. There has been comparatively little regional action from Asia, Africa, and South America, although this is beginning to happen on a limited scale. Regions and sub-regions in the developing world do have some capabilities, but their ability to undertake regional operations has been limited by lack of funds, logistics, and equipment. The AU, for example, has both the desire and some capacity to play a larger role in peace operations, but it is unlikely to receive adequate funds form the cash-strapped members who constitute that region.

As far as the Asia Pacific region is concerned, many ASEAN countries individually contribute to international peace support operations, so the capacity for regional peace operations within ASEAN is already considerable. But many of its member states are reluctant to consider moves that can be considered interference in the affairs of other states. Serious initiatives may thus be unlikely in near future if ASEAN retains its preference for diplomacy, dialogue, and a non-confrontational approach.

The ARF is possibly the only regional forum that involves not only countries of the Asian region, but also some powerful external regional players. Although it may not have resolved regional disputes or outbreak of conflicts, it has facilitated the reduction of tension and management of regional relationships. Nonetheless, unless the ARF can become more than simply a debating platform, it may begin to lose its relevance.

South Asian contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are a testimony to its commitment to the objectives of the UN Charter. As of September 2006, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Nepal were four of the top five UN troop contributors. If we include Sri Lanka, South Asia contributes slightly less than half the total global contribution. Because of the region's political dynamics, however, it is difficult to harness this capacity, even within South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). At the ground level, cooperation among these states is remarkable and the Indian peacekeeping training center has links and exchanges with centers in Bangladesh and Nepal, and has enjoyed visitors from Southeast Asian states and from China.

Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Malaysia, Australia, China, and Japan are all members of the IAPTC. At the moment, India is responsible for running the Secretariat. This current situation thus provides scope to find ways to act together in the region. The October IAPTC conference was a forum of exchange of information and doctrinal aspects and other activities, and was attended by governmental and UN representatives, some of them quite senior.

At the operational level, we need to review the UN standby arrangements, such as the inability of the UN to deploy rapidly. In many cases, by the time the UN mission is put in place, the situation on the ground has already evolved. While everyone at the UN has agreed in principle to the creation of a standing capacity, the Secretary-General has been reluctant to make a formal recommendation because of concerns that it would not be politically acceptable and that it may not find favor with the larger UN membership.

Why mention this? One of the most recent Resolutions, 1701 to Lebanon, was passed in August but we are now in December and the mission is still not up to strength. Fortunately, conditions there have still not completely broken down, but unfortunately there is still a chance of that happening. On the other hand, we have organizations like NATO and the EU that have rapid deployment capabilities and are not precluded by Chapter 8.

As far as the South Asian region is concerned, it is difficult to imagine that given its limited capabilities, SAARC will be able to coordinate peacekeeping and peace-building training activities or joint peace operations in the immediate future. We will have to look to the ARF to do this. Since India is part of the ARF initiative, there is scope to harness this capability for more effective utilization. In addition, states like China have taken an increasing interest in UN peacekeeping and Chinese personnel have been deployed to a number of UN missions. If China can be brought into this process, the capability will be enhanced considerably.

If we decide to create this capability, we must think seriously about how to make it effective. This may require doing something at the political level, such as creating a mechanism to monitor what is happening within the region or creating a database with regional leadership profiles. This may be considered by some to be an intrusion into the affairs of others, but we must be prepared to meet this resistance if we want to do this usefully. Another mechanism we might consider creating is one that monitors the activities of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as that Commission becomes more active. The first two cases with which the PBC will be concerned are

Liberia and Sierra Leone, but might later include East Timor. It would thus be useful to have a regional body to represent the region and to keep track of the PBC's activities.

While the creation of a regional peacekeeping training center would not be advisable at this stage, there is still promise in creating a regional association of peacekeeping training centers. This grouping would share experiences, training doctrine, and assist the UN in carrying out its mandates. The association could present its views to the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) and give these views greater strength. The UN is now undertaking a comprehensive review of its peacekeeping doctrine in a series of workshops, but many Asians were not even aware that such a thing was happening.

Regarding the development of a standing capability, this has not yet gone through at the UN, but we could consider this at the regional level. We should try to create such a standing capability, if not as one body, then at least interested regional countries and whoever else can contribute to brigade-size forces at a minimum that are ready for deployment within a week or so on demand. This is all perfectly do-able as long as it operates on a few key elements, such as logistical capabilities like sealift and airlift. Some states can provide this up to a point, but these capabilities can still be improved upon. If China is a part of the association, this capability increases. Furthermore, this regional association must include a standing rapid deployment capability, not just for peacekeeping, but also for disaster management purposes.

Aside from logistical questions, there are also matters of headquarters and leadership. If the ARF cannot be persuaded to take these ideas seriously, we can form a joint leadership mechanism in which all countries will have a sense of participation and involvement. If we are seriously considering these kinds of proposals, we must focus on the communication aspect. Each contingent can go in with its own equipment, but communication still needs to be standardized. Furthermore, if the region's countries accept this proposal, then the next step is to talk about joint training during scheduled times. This would serve a dual purpose of also being a valuable process of building confidence and mutual understanding. Some of these points may be raised during an upcoming ARF seminar in March 2007.

Discussion

(1) Would it not be a good idea to start from the Indian-hosted IAPTC, since that association would provide a good umbrella and is also able to encompass South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and others as well? If initiative were taken within that forum, would it be possible to raise vital political questions? If the IAPTC was willing to take that initiative, it would not substitute for a regional effort, but it would at least be a way of setting a regional process in motion. Perhaps Mr. Halim's proposal could be combined with the IAPTC initiative. For example, as has been mentioned, standby arrangements have been discussed at the UN for decades, but these discussions have not materialized into action because of political difficulties.

(2) The ARF may not be the best umbrella organization under which to launch these initiatives, due to its reputation as merely a 'talk shop'.

(3) Lt Gen Nambiar's suggestions are promising in addressing some of the problems we now face. There is a question, however, of where the world's flashpoints are. Most flashpoints are in Africa, West Asia, and South America. The number of flashpoints in Southeast Asia and other regions is in contrast quite small and that situation is not likely to change within the timeframe within which this capability would be built. We should thus think about where and for what purpose we would use this capability. Would it be like a bank of troops for deployment in any UN peacekeeping mission, or would it be used only within the Asia Pacific region itself? Furthermore, which body will make decisions regarding deployment and the mandate for that deployment? Will there be a steering committee or smaller representation or group of Asia Pacific nations? The most important thing is to boost the capabilities of some of these regional organizations, including

ensuring that they have standby arrangements with the flexibility to be available to the UN even outside the region if there is a need.

Lt Gen Nambiar: Whatever capability is proposed within the region should of course be available for international deployment at the request of the UN or other regional organizations such as the AU. But we should also think how and when it could be applied within the region, and who would make decisions about that deployment. The ARF was suggested since there is no other obvious body that would have the necessary decision making apparatus. If there is no such current mechanism, then perhaps the ARF's member countries could build such a mechanism. If the ARF is to go beyond dealing simply with economic issues, perhaps it needs to be shaken out of its lethargy. One great advantage of the ARF, for example, is that the Chinese are involved. Furthermore, it could be useful if there is a need to deploy to troubled areas within the region such as the Solomon Islands or East Timor.

(4) What General Nambiar is proposing is technical preparation for the establishment of a rapid deployment force. The decision making process of deploying these forces under the UN is not necessarily within the purview of what he is talking about since it would depend on a Security Council decision. At the same time, if the Asia Pacific region had a rapid deployment capability as part of a UN peacekeeping force, this would be a tremendous demonstration of the region's capability. This is one reason for suggesting that an international association take the initiative in preparing this capability, but not necessarily for making decisions about it.

(5) With respect to the consensus that peace-building activities need to be part of the mission from the beginning, the civilian component should be included in the work of these training centers. In the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), military personnel comprise about 50% of the mission. There is a tendency to look at aspects of reintegration merely from a technical standpoint. But reintegration is not just about the economic needs of ex-combatants. It is also about psychological and social reintegration. There is therefore a need for smaller reintegration niches. The AMM has also been monitoring disarmament and decommissioning processes, which have also been handled by civilians.

(6) We should consider what is practical in terms of forming an Asian Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers. We should also distinguish between short-term, mid-term, and long-term views. At this Study Group's March meeting, Vietnam and China both raised the issue of language capabilities. Perhaps this would be a good starting point. A next logical step would be training in each others' functional competencies in order to increase familiarity. Civilian police and other civilian experts could also be brought in and more collaborative activities could be introduced at a later stage.

Lt Gen Nambiar: A regional standing capacity would not be limited to military capacity, but would also include civilian capabilities, including civilian police.

(7) The AU is an example of a regional organization with stand-by capability through its Peace and Security Council. In UNMEE, for example, the AU entered Ethiopia and Eritrea and within six months consolidated a treaty and established a semblance of stability. It wants to assume a lead role in the initial deployment to trouble spots, but the largest obstacle it faces is financial.

(8) The EU has also begun to develop a 'rapid response team' training program.

(9) In talking about regional capacity building for use in the UN, can we also talk about regional capacity building in terms of what is happening in other regions? Is there, for example, a mechanism within the EU to talk about its experiences as it applies within the Asia Pacific region?

(10) Where does the US stand in all of this? Has the post-Iraq context stimulated a US interest in peacekeeping? How might the US become more engaged?

(11) The IAPTC is a forum for peacekeeping centers to discuss education, training and research related to peacekeeping and so has no political mandate or capability to undertake some of the proposed activities being suggested.

Lt General Nambiar. There is a lot happening within India, Europe, and Australia in terms their respective peacekeeping training centers, but comparatively little happening within the Asian region. Within the US, there are some who see the value in becoming more involved in peacekeeping but currently only about 1% of the U.S. military is committed to peacekeeping.

(12) The U.S is undergoing a dramatic change of policy that will likely impact its military policy. Robust military views have not been working, especially in light of the unfolding of events in Iraq. With a new US Defense Secretary, there may be opportunity within a context of ongoing reviews that there is value in finding ways to create stability rather than create wars.

Brigadier (Retd) Roger Mortlock: Summation: “What have we learned? How should the Asia Pacific region move forward on the issue of a regional approach to peacekeeping and peace-building?”

This Study Group’s three meetings have covered considerable terrain. This has included: Case studies of both regional and extra-regional (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tonga); disciplinary studies of military, police, NGOs, the ICRC, and others; and organizational studies of the United Nations, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, ASEAN, the IAPTC, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and individual UN peacekeeping missions.

The Study Group’s common findings include:

- (1) Various actors involved in peace support operations lack a common peacekeeping philosophy and doctrine;
- (2) UN mandates have problems with practicality;
- (3) There is a fair amount of dysfunction with respect to implementation of peace operations, namely, that peace-building activities need to be integrated from the beginning, but this must be done in a way that is sensible and well coordinated;
- (4) The UN faces problems with responding quickly to crises;
- (5) Coordination among the players involved must be better coordinated;
- (6) There is no common disciplinary code and no common core training for the various national peacekeeping training centers;
- (7) We must better understand how to use the local populations to apply pressure to their leaders not to return to conflict.

The Study Group also highlighted some new realities in international peacekeeping and peace-building:

- (1) A surge in the demand for peacekeeping interventions;
- (2) The creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission;
- (3) The growth of national peacekeeping training centers;
- (4) A profusion of NGOs and other humanitarian actors involved in peacekeeping and peace-building contexts;
- (5) A growing concern with the prevalence of mission failures;
- (6) The need for rapid deployment;
- (7) A new role for regional and cross-regional interventions;

- (8) An acknowledgement and application of the “Responsibility to Protect”¹⁷;
- (9) A demand for civilian police to play a larger role in peacekeeping and to be better integrated into the overall mission;
- (10) Military and police assuming multiple roles (with the distinctions between various actors’ roles becoming increasingly blurred);
- (11) Greater involvement of peacekeeping in intra-state conflict; and
- (12) The emergence of private security companies in peacekeeping operations.

The Study Group has distilled from its discussions primarily two observations: (1) Given its complex structure, it is fundamentally difficult for the UN to accommodate needed reform, both organizationally and in terms of promoting new doctrine; (2) Given the unlikelihood of UN reform, the way is thus open for regions to take greater initiative in promoting reforms of the current conduct of peace support operations.

Should the Asia Pacific region create a new model that is an example for the rest of the world? The Asian region is the single largest provider of UN peacekeepers, both military and police. UN statistics as of September 2005 show that nearly half the UN’s military personnel came collectively from Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia and the Pacific. Over a quarter of the UN’s police also come from these sub-regions.¹⁸ Asia Pacific participation thus should give the region a strong voice in the approach to and conduct of international peacekeeping and peace-building, but it is not clear how this voice should be used.

Two possible recommendations were drawn from these observations. First, an ASEAN Center for Peace-building and Reconstruction could be included in the new ASEAN Charter provisions. ASEAN could also act as a catalyst within the ARF on the development of a related consultation mechanism. Second, an Asia Pacific regional association of peacekeeping training centers could be formed within the framework of the IAPTC. Because the IAPTC is attended by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit, it could provide a direct pipeline to UN reform. This regional association could lead doctrine development and could also work towards the formation of a standby capacity ready for quick deployment. It would possibly have a functional headquarters and logistical deployment assets, such as a brigade-sized group with requisite civilian inclusions and available for cross-regional deployment.

Issues for further study include the need to analyze further police developments and potential and doctrinal integration.

From this overview, this Study Group can discern the following possible recommendations:

1. CSCAP Member Committees could recommend to their respective governments to support the courses and conferences conducted by the IAPTC as a means of promoting the development of common doctrine for peace missions.
2. CSCAP Member Committees could recommend to their respective governments to support the ICRC and include that organization in the training and preparation of peacekeepers.
3. This CSCAP Study Group could recommend to the ASEAN Regional Forum that an ASEAN Center for Peacebuilding and Reconstruction be included in the new ASEAN Charter provisions, and to other regional governments to explore ways to interact with it.
4. CSCAP Member Committees could recommend to their respective governments the creation of a regional standby force to meet UN requirements for rapid deployment.

¹⁷ <http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp>.

¹⁸ Center on International Cooperation (CIC), *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp. 137-39.

5. This Study Group could recommend to CSCAP the establishment of a new specialist Study Group to examine and analyze further civilian and police developments, potential, and doctrinal integration for peacekeeping doctrinal police and civilian development.

Dr. Lizée suggested the following framework for presenting the Study Group's recommendations.

An opening Preamble would note that more than half the world's peacekeepers come from the Asia Pacific region and that there is a gap between the region's presence on the ground (in terms of troop and police contributions) and their presence within UN decision-making structures. There is also, moreover, a gap in terms of perception; Asia is not the region where most of the world's flashpoints arise.

In terms of concrete recommendations, the first might be an endorsement of the creation of an Asian Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers. The contributions to this Study Group have reflected that various Asia Pacific states have developed different types of expertise and have encountered different types of problems. Many South Asian states have national peacekeeping training centers, as do China, Malaysia, and Australia. Japan may open one in 2008, and Vietnam is interested in establishing a center of its own. Others, such as some Pacific Island states, have an interest in establishing these training centers, but they do not currently have the capacity to do so. This association could thus serve as a mechanism through which expertise and experiences could be shared and through which dialogue on issues such as education, training, research, and pre-deployment briefings could take place. It could also be a way for a country like Vietnam to build up its own capacity in these areas.

Second, we need a consultative and advisory body within the ARF structure that deals with peacekeeping and peace-building matters. Although there is some validity in the observation that the ARF is merely a 'talk shop', it is the only available regional body that might play such a role. Furthermore, there may be some interest within the ARF in moving forward on issues that permit it to have concrete but realistic proposals. Such discussions could focus on developing an Asian voice within the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and monitoring the PBC's development. Also, while the language may have to be softened, we could still propose serious consideration of a regional standing force that deals first with humanitarian crises such as the December 2004 tsunami. Considerations of sovereignty and past historical experiences will always figure in, but the post-tsunami response has demonstrated the region's ability to mobilize.

Third, there needs to be movement within ASEAN along the lines described by Mr. Halim. ASEAN has positioned itself as a catalyst within the ARF in terms of engaging on certain issues. The creation of an ASEAN Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Center fits well within the ongoing discussion of an ASEAN Security Community and the movement toward an ASEAN Charter. This would provide a focal point for development within Southeast Asia for, for example, for creating new national peacekeeping training centers and in terms of relationship between ASEAN and the rest of the region. ASEAN could act as a catalyst and bring forward these issues within the ARF.

Fourth, we need language regarding the integration of civilian components and constant dialogue with humanitarian actors, police actors, military actors and regional diplomatic actors, in all phases and across all spectra of the operations. In terms of the activities of regional peacekeeping training centers, the civilian component must be engaged in the training in terms of developing a program of pre-deployment briefings to the military.

Discussion

(1) It should be made clear that the Study Group reports directly to the CSCAP Steering Committee, not to regional governments. Also, many regional missions have UN support, but are

not UN missions. In the South Pacific, for example, Australia and New Zealand contribute approximately 2,500 police and military personnel.

(2) In talking about the need for an Asian Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers in the context of the IAPTC, does such an Asian Association fit within the IAPTC context? Second regardless of what the ARF's current limitations are, we can still recommend that it take a more active role.

(3) With respect to the fourth recommendation, the wording should suggest that ASEAN needs to establish or create a peacekeeping program by establishing a center within the ASEAN Secretariat. This wording should be used to demonstrate the ASEAN ISIS that this is somewhat different than what they have been suggesting. In other words, what is proposed here is a 'program' which is not an 'institution'.

(4) We should also not use the word 'body' because that might imply the creation of a new body. The words 'consultative mechanism' might be more suitable.

(5) The IAPTC is an association with membership in the sense that centers, offices or departments apply for membership. If we set up an Asian Association, would that association apply for group membership? Technically, there should be no problem on that issue, since we are simply setting up another body to facilitate thinking within the region.

(6) We should be reluctant to suggest layer upon layer of bureaucracy, but since our focus is in forming a joint effort between South Asia and Southeast Asia there is nothing wrong with calling it an 'Asian Center'. But does this conflict in any way with the IAPTC?

(7) This Study Group should proceed with prudence and take more time to digest the recommendations. Organize a standing force within region would be a long and complicated process and may not even be feasible. And what would be the nature of this association of training centers? What sort of body or mechanism would it be? What would the relationship be between this center and other existing mechanisms and consultative bodies or programs? What is meant by 'region' here? Does this refer to the entire Asia Pacific or just South Asian and Southeast Asia? Even if this Study Group emphasizes a role for regional organizations, we still need to do so in a way that respects the leading role of the UN. Perhaps we should include a point in these recommendations to say that efforts will be made to give regional mechanisms or programs for peace operations a larger role, but at the same time regional mechanisms and programs should be in constant coordination with UN to support UN peace operations.

(8) It is perfectly reasonable to include a provision that all proposed activities would be done within a context of broader engagement and constant dialogue with the UN. But the UN needs to move forward on these issues. The PBC is a reflection of this. Underlying this language will be the sense that the region will not act outside this context of dialogue with the UN.

(9) We do not want to create the impression that South Asia has expertise and would spread that expertise to Southeast Asia and that this is the end of the process. In Northeast Asia, Japan is developing a peacekeeping training center, and China is also becoming increasingly involved in operations. The crises in the Pacific Islands and other types of crises in the region are of concern to all Asia, and other countries are of course welcome to join the discussions.

(10) If we recommend that a regional peacekeeping capability exist under an 'umbrella', this may be too constraining. If the AMM, for example, had to conduct its activities under an 'umbrella', it would not likely have had the effectiveness it has had.

(11) A regional operation reporting to the UN might not be that feasible. Regional operations fill a critical role in responding to immediate problems like natural disasters or the breakdown of law and order. In such cases it is critical to get an operation there within hours. These regional-level

operations should report to the UN for information, and should seek its endorsement, but it is difficult to imagine, for example, that the Australian government would be amenable to having to report to and be cleared by the UN for all that it does in the South Pacific.

(12) The UN Charter does leave room for regional initiatives so long as those initiatives do not contravene UN activities.

(13) Regarding how regional organizations fit within UN leadership, Chapter 8 of the UN Charter reads: "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements and agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council."

(14) Regarding CSCAP China's concern [about the desirability and feasibility of creating regional standby capacity and about using them under the UN umbrella], in talking about peacekeeping missions and enforcement, we are actually looking at three different things. First, a stand-by or small-sized force could be used at the regional level, for example, in the event of a humanitarian disaster like the December 2004 tsunami. If this were the case, then we would probably only need consultation at the regional-level. Every participating country could mobilize and the UN could become involved later. Second, in terms of a regional capacity for peacekeeping, we could consider deploying it outside the region. Finally, from a capacity point of view, peacekeeping training centers could have bilateral or multilateral arrangements to build up the capacity of this force.

(15) The Chinese point is valid and should be included in the Preamble. Furthermore, given the wording of Chapter 8, the word umbrella is too restrictive. In fact, the UN is not involved in every international peacekeeping effort. So perhaps it would be better to say 'in support of the principles of the UN Charter'. There is no need to have constant consultation with the Security Council, except for Chapter 7 missions that require consultation and agreement.

(16) The phrase "coordination with civilian components" lumps all civilian components together, when they are in fact often separate in their organization, work, and particular missions. Also, there are ongoing debates within the context of UN reform regarding which NGOs or international organizations will be integrated into a UN response to conflict or with which NGOs and international organizations they will coordinate. Many NGOs, including major ones, still do not believe that 'integration' is the best way to talk about how they are working with UN agencies.

(17) We should make a distinction between the ICRC and NGOs. We should also specify that we agree to 'coordination' but not 'integration'.

(18) Many regional organizations do not have the kind of mandate needed to conduct the types of activities suggested here. For the ARF to adopt such a mandate may be exceeding what its structure empowers it to do. Also, in the discussions about capacity building, the need is for initial intervention within 15-20 days of the outbreak of conflict. This would not be the scale and scope of a full UN mission, but rather one focused precisely on achieving stability in an area while the UN mobilizes itself for deployment. If from the beginning the mission includes the whole range of human rights and development organizations, the mission will lose focus. If we want a capability that can respond quickly, we should then modify our aims.

(19) Are we talking about a mechanism of integration in the planning stage, or about developing a doctrine surrounding integration of civilian components?

(20) Regarding the integration of civilian components, when two states have gone to war, after an initial agreement is reached, someone needs to enter to establish a buffer zone. Only after that can discussions about human rights happen.

(21) This Study Group could take into account the fact that in many cases NGOs and other actors such as the ICRC may be present in a conflict area and there would be a need for new actors to coordinate with them.

(22) How could this work in a 'war of the people' scenario in which two sides in a conflict are inter-mixed and there is no prospect of a geographic buffer zone?

(23) The initial requirement in any conflict situation is military stability and creating the political and military space for a negotiation of a ceasefire, for example. Our focus should remain on finding ways to do that.

(24) This Study Group should not be too restrictive in its recommendations and should not be too UN-centric in its view. If a state requests assistance from a regional organization, that organization could make its own decision. This does not necessarily mean responding with the use of force, but it may also mean other ways of supporting dispute settlement. In some cases, there may therefore be no need to go the UN, and this may all be well within the norms of international law and behavior.

Appendix I: Recommendations Submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

The ICRC shares the ground with peace support operations (PSO) forces in many contexts. The ICRC wishes to pursue and develop dialogue with these forces at each stage of a PSO (during the mandate's deployment): prior to deployment of PSO forces, during operations, and after deployment. It stands ready to participate in pre-deployment briefings (by presenting its operations in the recipient country as well as its legal reading of the humanitarian situation) and in post-action reviews. It also stands ready to support the concerned states and regional organizations in the implementation of the following recommendations:

1. Military personnel should complement the work of humanitarian organizations in PSO by ensuring the safety of humanitarian workers and access for humanitarian assistance. For effective coordination, cooperation and constant exchange of information is required.
2. States providing troops for PSO shall ensure that all concerned military personnel are familiar with the role and mandate of the ICRC and of other humanitarian organizations (international organizations and NGOs). In particular, they should be aware that the ICRC, on the basis of its fundamental principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, will engage with and coordinate its humanitarian responses with other actors involved in PSO, but cannot be coordinated by them.
3. Regardless of the type of PSO (UN mandated and otherwise), the states providing troops for those PSO should ensure that all concerned military personnel receive training in and respect for the applicable law, as defined by the situation on the ground (international humanitarian rights law (IHL), human rights law, and domestic law). This should be reflected in all orders and instructions, including rules of engagement.
4. The UN and other regional bodies involved in PSO should insist on training in IHL and human rights as a prerequisite for participation in any PSO. Common minimum standards in these areas should be developed for use by all Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), including through the existing network of national peacekeeping centers.
5. The requirement for compliance with IHL and human rights law must be reflected in the legislation, orders, instructions and directives of all TCN; this must include measures for their enforcement, including the establishment of jurisdiction over offenders and effective sanctions for violations.
6. The relevant applicable law for each PSO must be incorporated by all TCN into their doctrine, education and training and should be backed by an effective sanctions system. This process must take place prior to deployment. A top-down driven process involving the highest levels of the chain of command must be put in place in order for lawful behavior to become second nature.

Glossary of Terms

AFP – Australian Federal Police

AMM – Aceh Monitoring Mission

ARF – ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEAN-ISIS – ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies

AU – African Union

CAVR – Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor

DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

ECP – Enhanced Cooperation Program (to Papua New Guinea)

FAO – (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization

F-FDTL – East Timorese Military

IAPTC – International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

IDG – International Deployment Group (of the Australian Federal Police)

IHL – International Humanitarian Law

MONUC – UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

OAS – Organization of American States

PSO – Peace Support Operations

PIF – Pacific Islands Forum

PNG – Papua New Guinea

PNTL – East Timor Police Service

PPF – (RAMSI) Participating Police Force

RAMSI – Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands

RPNCG – Royal PNG Constabulary

RSIP – Royal Solomon Islands Police

SAARC – South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

TAC – Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia

TCC - Troop Contributing Country

TLPDP – Timor Leste Police Development Program

UN – United Nations

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNMEE – United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIS – United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNMIT – United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (East Timor)

List of Participants

AUS-CSCAP

Mr. A. John McFarlane

Visiting Fellow, Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200 Australia
Email: John.McFarlane@adfa.edu.au

CSCAP Canada

Dr. Pierre P. Lizée (Study Group Co-Chair)

Chancellor's Research Chair in Global Politics
Brock University
St. Catharines, Ontario
L2S 3A1 Canada
Email: plizee@brocku.ca

CSCAP China

Mr. Wen Bing

Research Fellow,
Military Attaché
Department of Strategic Studies
Academy of Military Sciences of the
People's Liberation Army
Email: jkwenbing@sina.com.cn

Col. Zhang Gan

Deputy Military, Naval & Air Attaché
Embassy of the PRC
Gate No. 6 Panshsheel Marg
Chanakapuri
New Delhi 110021 India
Email: zhanggan2003@yahoo.com.cn

Mr. Zhou Xingbao

Secretary-General, CSCAP China
Senior Research Fellow,
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)
3rd Toutiao, Taijichang
Beijing 100005 China
Email: ccis@mx.cei.gov.cn

CSCAP India

Lt. General (Rtd) Satish Nambiar

Director, United Service Institution of India
Rao Tularam Marg, Post Bag No. 8
Vasant Vihar PO
New Delhi 110 057 India
Email: director@usiofindia.org

Ambassador Kishan S. Rana
CSCAP India
Email: kishanrana@gmail.com

Major General Rajender Singh
UNMEE

Brigadier General GV Satyanarayana
MONUC

Col. (Retd.) Kulwant Kumar Sharma
New Delhi India
Email: kulwantks@sify.com

CSCAP Indonesia

Mr. Omar Halim
Former UNSG Special Representative
Istana Harmoni Apartment 27th fl. No. 1
Jalan Suryopranoto no. 2
Jakarta, Indonesia
Email: ohalim@pacific.net.id

CSCAP New Zealand

Brigadier (Retd) Roger Mortlock
Member, Public Advisory Committee on
Disarmament and Arms Control
30 The Crowsnest, Whitby,
Wellington, New Zealand
Email: rsmortlock@xtra.co.nz

Other Participants

Dr. Renate Korber
Reintegration Coordinator and GAM Focal Point
Reporting and Analysis Cell
Aceh Monitoring Mission
Banda Aceh, Indonesia
Email: renate.korber@gmail.com

Mr. Larry Maybee
Regional Legal Advisor, ICRC
Regional Delegation for South Asia
47 Sunder Nagar
New Delhi 110003 India
Email: lmaybee.del@icrc.org

Mr. Stephan Sakalian
Adviser for Multilateral Affairs in Asia
ICRC Regional Delegation
Unit 50-11-1, Level 11 – Wisma UOA
Damansara – Damansara Heights 50490
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Email: ssakalian.kua@icrc.org

Observers

Col D.S. Gill

Secretary, Board of Management
Centre for UN Peacekeeping
New Delhi India
Email: coldsgill23@hotmail.com

Ms. Madhuri Gupta

Assistant Director (Academic)
Indian Council of World Affairs
CSCAP India
Sapru House
Barakhamba Road
New Delhi 110 001 India
Email: madhuri_gupta@yahoo.co.uk

Ms. Ma Li

Staff, CSCAP China Secretariat
3rd Toutiao, Taijichang
Beijing 100005 China
Email: mali@ciis.org.cn

Ms. Shairi Mathur

Research Assistant
Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping
United Service Institution of India
New Delhi 110 057 India
Email: sectt@iaptc.org

Ms. Suchismita Mishra

Research Assistant
Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research
United Service Institution of India
New Delhi, India
Email: suchirkl@gmail.com

Ms. Erin Elizabeth Williams

CSCAP Canada Administrator
Centre of International Relations
University of British Columbia
6476 NW Marine Drive
Vancouver, British Columbia
V6T 1Z2 Canada
Email: cscapcan@interchange.ubc.ca

Manzar Zamma

Research Assistant
Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research
United Service Institution of India
New Delhi, India
Email: manzarzamma@gmail.com